Abstract. This paper shows a generic method of constructing CCA-secure public key encryption schemes with leakage-resilience on the secret key. It is based on a new kind of universal 2 hash proof system which accepts an auxiliary parameter. Specifically, two schemes are presented, basing on the DCR assumption and DLIN assumption respectively.
Introduction

Background
Building cryptographic schemes secure even if the secrets are partially leaked is a trend in cryptography, motivating partially from side channel attacks. In this paper we are interested in public key encryption (PKE) schemes with leakage-resilience. Let us first summarize the literature.
In 2009, Akavia, Goldwasser, and Vaikuntanathan [1] gave the model and the first leakage-resilient chosen plaintext attack (IND-lrCPA) secure scheme under the LWE assumption. Afterwards, Naor and Segev [8] presented both IND-lrCPAsecure and leakage-resilient chosen ciphertext attack (IND-lrCCA) secure schemes based on the decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption. More precisely, they used universal 1 hash proof systems (HPS) [2] to build IND-lrCPA-secure schemes. For IND-lrCCA-secure schemes, they used the Naor-Yung paradigm yielding systems with good leakage tolerance, but which are quite inefficient and thus of theoretical interest only. To achieve efficiency, they considered the Cramer-Shoup scheme [2] under the DDH assumption. Dodis et al. [4] continued by schemes with very good leakage tolerance, but with a big trade-off in efficiency (see Table 1 ). /jqj 1=18 DLIN (no pairing) Table 1 . IND-lrCCA-secure PKE schemes. s seed; m message; q; jqj base group order and its bit length; N 1 base modulus; 0 < ı < 1 and`2 < jqj; jN 1 j. We treat one multi-exponentiation as 1:5 single exponentiation, and only consider schemes in G D hgi for computational cost. The scheme in [4] requires heavy computation, including pairing, so we do not put the cost for comparison.
It might be quite curious that Naor and Segev did not mention anything on universal 2 HPS in [8] . Furthermore, they did not examine other well-known variants of Cramer-Shoup like the Kurosawa-Desmedt scheme [3, 7] . In fact, there are certain difficulties for settling these, as we show below.
Our contributions
Results. We show how to build IND-lrCCA-secure PKE schemes from universal 2 HPS accepting an auxiliary input. Specifically, two schemes are presented, basing on the decisional composite residuosity (DCR) assumption and DLIN assumption respectively. Our DCR-based scheme is the first one with IND-lrCCA security in the literature. Likewise, our DLIN-based scheme is the first one without pairing operations. Hence it is much more efficient than the previous scheme [4] albeit the leakage rate is smaller.
A comparison is given in Table 1 , where the leakage rate is defined as the supremum of total leakage size secret key size when considering large base groups.
Technical hurdles. For illustrative discussions, let us consider the KurosawaDesmedt scheme which is IND-CCA secure under the DDH assumption [7] . It serves as a warm up for our generic construction although the leakage rate is smaller than that of [8] . (The leakage rate is 1=12 compared to 1=6 in [8] .)
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The secret key is sk D .x 1 ; x 2 ; y 1 ; y 2 / and the public key contains c D g
and d D g
, and a target collision resistant function TCR. A ciphertext on message m is of the form .u 1 ; u 2 ; e; t/ where
Roughly speaking, the crux in proving CCA security in [3, 7] is to show that any v is randomly distributed given c; d and a fixed v . This implies that .k 1 ; k 2 / is random, so that symmetric encryption e D SE k 1 .m/ together with authentication MAC k 2 .e/ will guarantee CCA security.
However, in the leakage setting, it is not ensured that v is random. This is because v D u
(for˛D TCR.u 1 ; u 2 /) is written as a function of sk, and hence the adversary can ask for some information on it. A natural attempt to deal with this situation would be to extract random bits from v. Namely let .k 1 ; k 2 / D Ext.vI s/ for a randomness extractor Ext, with a random seed s additionally put in the ciphertext (to enable decryption). If v has high entropy, .k 1 ; k 2 / should be random as required.
The attempt, while intuitively appealing, does not work! The reason is that the seed s is completely controlled by the adversary in decryption, and thus is not random. In turn, .k 1 ; k 2 / D Ext.vI s/ is not random as desired.
Looking into [8] , the same issue occurs, and is resolved as follows. The value v itself is directly used for authentication, namely check v D u
for every decryption request. However, the symmetric encryption key k 1 comes from another random source (an extra public key h D g
2 ), which is unavailable in our setting. (In fact, that source causes additional computation and ciphertext size in [8] , compared to ours.)
We overcome the above difficulty as follows. Let us split v into three equal parts, namely v D k 0 kk 1 kk 2 , and note that k 0 ; k 1 ; k 2 have enough entropy when v does. Here we at least need the leakage amount < jvj=3. The leakage rates in our schemes are worsened by this step. The authentication (i.e. MAC) is now of the form t D k 1 e˚k 2 . When k 1 ; k 2 have high entropy, this authentication will reject all ill-formed ciphertexts, since passing the authentication amounts to computing k 2 D t˚k 1 e. In addition, let the challenge e D Ext.k 0 I s /˚m b for random seed s . It seems that the same issue on the seed is repeated here, but it is not, since ill-formed ciphertexts are anyway rejected by the authentication, and s in forming the challenge ciphertext is not controlled by the adversary.
Generally, the same technique works for PKE derived from universal 2 HPS accepting an auxiliary parameter (which is the extractor's seed), as shown in Section 4.2.
Organization of this paper. We present the leakage-resilient scheme based on the Kurosawa-Desmedt scheme in Section 3. We show how to generalize the idea to universal 2 hash proof systems in Section 4.2, which additionally yields schemes based on DLIN and decisional composite residuosity (DCR) assumptions.
Preliminaries
Notations. For a set A, let jAj denote its cardinality. Taking a randomly from A is expressed by a $ A. Let jaj denote the number of bits representing a. Hence
DDH assumption. Let G D hgi be a group of prime public order q generated by g. The DDH assumption on G asserts that for all poly-time distinguishers D, 
as defined in [5] , which also proved the following result.
Lemma 2.1 ([5, Lemma 2.2]).
If Y has 2 possible values and Z is any random variable, then
When applying the lemma in our context, Y stands for the leakage on secret key X, while Z is another information on X such as given by the public key. The lemma then says that, given a leakage amount of bits, the secret key's entropy is decreased by . Hereafter, when referring to entropy, we mean average minentropy unless otherwise stated.
A function Ext W ¹0; 1º n Seed ! ¹0; 1º`is called a .k; Ext /-randomness extractor if for all pairs of random variables .X; I / such that X is an n-bit string satisfying Q H 1 .XjI / k, SD .Ext.X; s/; s; I /; .rand; s; I / Ä Ext ;
where s $ Seed and rand $ ¹0; 1º`. In other words, Ext.X; s/ is nearly random given s and I (when Ext is small enough). Randomness extractors can be realized via pairwise independent hash functions.
PKE with IND-lrCCA security. A PKE consists of key generation KG, encryption Enc, and decryption Dec algorithms. KG outputs public key pk and secret key sk. The algorithm Enc pk .m/ returns a ciphertext c which can be decrypted by Dec sk .c/.
To define leakage-resilient CCA security for PKE, consider the following game with adversary A. First, .pk; sk/ KG and pk is given to A. In the so-called find stage, A can access to a decryption oracle Dec sk . / to decrypt any string of its choice. Furthermore, A can query arbitrary functions f to a leakage oracle Leak sk . / which returns f .sk/. We require that the total length of all returned f .sk/ must be less than a fixed in bits.
Then A submits a pair of m 0 ; m 1 such that jm 0 j D jm 1 j to a challenge oracle. The oracle returns a challenge ciphertext C D Enc pk .m b /, where b 2 ¹0; 1º is randomly chosen.
After that, in the guess stage, A can access to the decryption oracle Dec sk . / but cannot to the leakage oracle Leak sk . /. (This restriction is necessary since otherwise A uses f . / D Dec . / .C / to get partial information on m b , so the game is trivial.) A is not allowed to query the challenge ciphertext C to the decryption oracle either. Finally, A returns b 0 as a guess of the hidden b.
The PKE scheme is IND-lrCCA-secure if
s negligible for all poly-time A.
3 Leakage-resilient Kurosawa-Desmedt scheme
In this section, we show a leakage-resilient variant of Kurosawa-Desmedt encryption scheme [3, 7] with the leakage rate 1=12 under the DDH assumption. This is a warm up of our generic construction later in Section 4 although the leakage rate is smaller than 1=6 in [8] .
Let G be a group of order q. We assume that there exists an injection KDF W G ! ¹0; 1º jqj . For example, let G D .Z q / 2 be the q-order subgroup of Z p (where p D 2q C 1 is also a prime). Then the following KDF satisfies our condition: 1 KDF.x/ D´x if 0 < x < p=2; p x if p=2 < x < p:
; Ext /-randomness extractor, and PRG W ¹0; 1º`! ¹0; 1º be a pseudo-random generator. Also needed are target collision resistant (TCR) functions TCR W G 2 Seed ! Z q , and a collision resistant hash function H W ¹0; 1º ! ¹0; 1º jqj=3 . 
The leakage rate. Remember that the total leakage on sk which an adversary can learn from the leakage oracle is less than bits. Setting 2 jqj=3 (see below) to be negligible, i.e., Proof. Let K i denote the random variable induced by k i for i D 0; 1; 2. We say that a ciphertext .u 1 ; u 2 ; e; t; s/ is invalid if
and r 1 ¤ r 2 . We will proceed in games, each of which is a modification of the previous one. Below,
Game 0 : This game is the IND-lrCCA attack game with an adversary A. The challenge ciphertext is denoted by C D .u 1 ; u 2 ; e ; t ; s /. We denote by r ;˛ ; v ; k 0 ; k 1 ; k 2 the corresponding intermediate quantities. We also assume that r ; u 1 ; u 2 ;˛ ; v ; k 0 ; k 1 ; k 2 are computed at the beginning of the game because they do not depend on m 0 ; m 1 which are provided by A later. 
/:
We can show that jPrOEX 1 PrOEX 2 j is negligible under the DDH assumption in the same way as in [3, 7] . In particular, the DDH distinguisher can simulate the leakage oracle which returns f .sk/ because sk is chosen by the DDH distinguisher.
The decryption oracle is given not only sk but also ! such that g 2 D g ! 1 . We can do this because we do not use the DDH distinguisher from now on. Then in the find stage, the decryption oracle returns ? for .u 1 ; u 2 ; e; t; s/ if u 2 ¤ u ! 1 . That is, the simulator rejects all invalid ciphertexts in the find stage. We show jPrOEX 2 PrOEX 3 j is negligible. Namely, we prove that in Game 2 , any invalid ciphertext is rejected by the decryption oracle with overwhelming probability. Note that, from the adversary's point of view, sk D .x 1 ; x 2 ; y 1 ; y 2 / is uniformly random subject to c D g
, ignoring the leakage functions f for now.
Let C 0 D .u 1 ; u 2 ; e; t; s/ be the first invalid ciphertext queried by A, where ; and the matrix U is of rank 3. This means that v is random from A's point of view. Now A learns at most bits leakage f .sk/. Given f .sk/ and .c; d /, the entropy of v is at least log q from Lemma 2.1. The entropy of .K 0 ; K 1 ; K 2 / is also log q because k 0 kk 1 kk 2 D KDF.v/ and KDF is an injection. Therefore for any k 0 ; k 1 ; k 2 , we have
Hence
This means that C 0 is rejected with overwhelming probability. An almost identical argument holds for all the subsequent invalid decryption queries.
In the guess stage, if A queries an invalid ciphertext with .u 1 ; u 2 ; s/ ¤ .u 1 ; u 2 ; s / but˛D˛ , then the decryption oracle returns ?.
We can show that jPrOEX 3 PrOEX 4 j is negligible in the same way as in [3, 7] because TCR is a target collision resistant function. We show that jPrOEX 4 PrOEX 5 j is negligible by proving such ciphertext is also rejected with overwhelming probability in Game 4 . The situation is similar to ; in which det.M / D ! 2 .r 2 r 1 /.r 2 r 1 /.˛ ˛ / ¤ 0. Hence by using the same argument as given in Game 3 , we can see that C is rejected with overwhelming probability.
Game 6 : In the guess stage, if A queries an invalid ciphertext C ¤ C such that .u 1 ; u 2 ; s/ D .u 1 ; u 2 ; s /, then the decryption oracle returns ?.
We show that jPrOEX 5 PrOEX 6 j is negligible, by proving that in Game 5 , any such ciphertext is also rejected with overwhelming probability. Let C 0 D .u 1 ; u 2 ; e; t; s/ be the first such ciphertext queried by A.
If e D e , then t D t which means that C 0 D C . Therefore it must be that e ¤ e . In this case, H.e/ ¤ H.e / since H is collision resistant. Then there exists a unique solution .k 1 ; k 2 / which satisfies the above linear equations. Let .a 1 ; a 2 / denote this solution.
On the other hand, in Game 5 , A does not learn any more information on .x 1 ; x 2 ; y 1 ; y 2 / from the invalid ciphertexts such that .u 1 ; u 2 ; s/ ¤ .u 1 ; u 2 ; s / because they are all rejected. Hence it is enough to consider
ƒ‚ … V 2 6 6 6 6 4
Since the matrix V has rank 3, v is random from A's point of view if we ignore the leakage functions f and C . Note that k 0 kk 1 kk 2 D KDF.v / and e is independent of .k 1 ; k 2 /. Hence given f .sk/, and t 2 ¹0; 1º jqj=3 and .c; d /, the entropy of .k 1 ; k 2 / is at least
Therefore,
This means that C 0 is rejected with overwhelming probability. All the subsequent such ciphertexts are rejected similarly.
Game 7 : Replace PRG.Ext.K 0 ; s // with a random string in the challenge ciphertext C . We show that jPrOEX 6 PrOEX 7 j is negligible.
In Game 6 , all invalid ciphertexts are rejected by the decryption oracle. In addition, by submitting valid ciphertexts, A only learns a linear combination of log g 1 c D x 1 C !x 2 and log g 1 d D y 1 C !y 2 which A already knew from the public key. Hence as shown in Game 6 , v is random from A's point of view if we ignore the leakage functions f and C . Further k 0 kk 1 kk 2 D KDF.v / and k 0 is independent of t . Hence given f .sk/; t and .c; d /, the entropy of K 0 is at least jqj 3 1:
Hence Ext.K 0 ; s / is statistically indistinguishable from a random string. Thus, PRG.Ext.K 0 ; s // is computationally indistinguishable from a random string.
Now in
This means that jPrOEb 0 D b 1=2j is negligible in the original attack game.
Generalization to universal hash proof system
In this section, we generalize our leakage-resilient scheme of Section 3 to universal hash proof systems (HPS).
HPS with auxiliary input
The notion of hash proof systems was introduced by Cramer and Shoup to construct an IND-CCA secure hybrid encryption scheme [2] . In key encapsulation mechanism (KEM), let SK; PK, and K be sets of secret keys, public keys, and encapsulated symmetric keys. E is the set of all ciphertexts of KEM, and V E is the set of all "valid" ones. In addition, S is a set of seeds. In Kurosawa-Desmedt scheme,
The subset membership assumption says that V is indistinguishable from E. If V D ¹.g A function ƒ sk W E S ! K is projective if there exists a projection W SK ! PK such that pk D .sk/ defines ƒ sk W V S ! K. Namely, for every E 2 V, the value K D ƒ sk .E; s/ is uniquely determined by pk D .sk/ and .E; s/, where s 2 S.
A projective function ƒ sk is called computationally universal 2 if for all E; E 6 2 V with .E; s/ ¤ .E ; s /, pk; ƒ sk .E ; s /; ƒ sk .E; s/ and pk; ƒ sk .E ; s /; K New leakage-resilient CCA-secure public key encryption 307 are computationally indistinguishable, where sk and K are random. It is worth noting that ƒ sk has an additional input s, compared to previous works. While the original HPS in [2] requires E ¤ E , our property here allows E D E if s ¤ s .
In our scheme of Section 3, Pub.pk; E; s; r/ returns ƒ sk .E; s/ for E 2 V, where s 2 S and r is a witness of the fact that E 2 V. Priv.sk; E; s/ returns ƒ sk .E; s/ (without knowing a witness).
Leakage resilient CCA-secure PKE from HPS
Let q D jKj (prime, except in Section 4.4). We assume that there exists an injection KDF W K ! ¹0; 1º jqj . Let Ext W ¹0; 1º jqj=3 Seed ! ¹0; 1º`be a .jqj=3
; Ext /-randomness extractor, and PRG W ¹0; 1º`! ¹0; 1º be a pseudo-random generator. Also needed is a collision resistant hash function H W ¹0; 1º ! ¹0; 1º jqj=3 . Key generation: Run Param to define .group; SK; PK; K; E; V ; ƒ . / . /; W SK ! PK; S/:
Let a public key be pk D .sk/ for a random secret sk 2 SK. Below The proof idea is almost the same as that of Theorem 3.1. More details are given below.
Proof. We proceed in games as follows. Also, decryption queries are handled as in Table 2 .
Game 1 : Compute Pub.pk; E ; s ; r / as Priv.sk; E ; s /. We have PrOEX 0 D PrOEX 1 .
We have jPrOEX 1 PrOEX 2 j Ä sm thanks to the subset membership problem.
Game 3 : Any decryption query .e; E; t; s/ with .s; E/ ¤ .s ; E / and E 6 2 V is answered by ?. We have jPrOEX 2 PrOEX 3 j Ä hash thanks to the hashcomputationally universal 2 property. Namely, ƒ sk .E; s/ D Pub.pk; E; s; r/ D k 0 kk 1 kk 2 is random-like conditioned on pk and ƒ sk .E ; s /. Conditioned further on the leakage amount , the entropy of k 1 kk 2 is still high, so that the check k 2 D t˚k 1 e goes through with negligible probability (which is computed like in the proof of Theorem 3.1.)
In The reason is that, thanks to the hash -computationally universal 2 property, ƒ sk .E ; s / D k 0 kk 1 kk 2 still has high entropy, given ƒ sk .E; s/; pk and leakage amount . To obtain any further information on K 0 , the adversary must submit for decryption queries of the form .s ; E ; e; t/ with .e; t / ¤ .e ; t /. However, since k 1 kk 2 has high entropy, those decryption queries will be rejected. ; h r 1 Cr 2 / W r 1 ; r 2 2 Z q º, where g 1 ; g 2 ; h 2 G. The DLIN assumption says that E and V are indistinguishable.
